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A Study of Integration:  
The Role of Sensus Communis in Integrating Disciplinary Knowledge 
 
Laureen Park 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Much has been written about interdisciplinarity (ID) and its promise for addressing 
crucial educational objectives. William Newell, one of the earliest scholars in the field of ID 
believes that ID studies and integrative learning are the two most effective tools for educating 
students to be prepared for the complex world in which we live.1 And Julie Thompson Klein, 
another established scholar in ID studies wrote, “The costs of ignoring these commonalities [of 
the disciplines] are enormous.”2 There are many ways to approach ID and integration, and 
scholars in the field have attempted to elucidate different aspects of their methods, objectives, 
function, and history. Not all scholarship in ID focuses on integration. However, like Newell, 
Klein and other scholars in the field, I believe that integration is central to the process and 
objectives of ID studies.3 It is the successful achievement of this that sets ID apart from 
multidisciplinarity (MD), an approach that does not necessarily seek commonalities among 
different disciplines.  
In this chapter, I present my reflections on my four years of experience teaching in an 
introductory level ID course offered at the New York City College of Technology called Weird 
Science. The goal of the course is to explore what it means to be human in the age of technology 
by exposing undergraduate students to various disciplinary perspectives which are provided by 
guest lecturers. There is one main instructor whose discipline is English, who listens to all the 
guest lecturers along with the students, and who helps to facilitate the process of integrating the 
disciplines. The guest lecturers are mostly full-time faculty at the college and include 
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representation from Physics, Biology, Psychology, Computer Sciences, Sociology, and 
Philosophy (this is my discipline). Using observations from class lectures and discussions, verbal 
and e-mail discussions with students, homework and papers, I draw some conclusions about how 
emerging learners integrate disciplinary knowledge, and how philosophy in particular supports 
this process.  
Initially, what struck me about student papers was what I thought to be lacking about 
them. I observed papers that appeared rather quirky and colloquial. For example, a Weird 
Science student, W.C., wrote, in referring to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum’, “According to 
Descartes a person that does not have a cognitive process is considered nonexistent.”4 This is, at 
best, a misunderstanding of Descartes’ idea that thinking is proof of existence. Other examples 
include a few students whose theses claimed that the question of what it means to be human was 
unanswerable or endless.5 And several papers had seemingly subjective and opinionated theses, 
such as that humans were greedy and selfish or that we should find a new definition of genius.6 I 
believe that the initial lens I used in interpreting these papers were caused by my assumption that 
students would have a ready, academic discourse that could transcend and unify the various 
disciplines. What I have more recently concluded is that, despite initial appearances, students 
were doing their best to integrate disciplinary knowledge, and that they indeed had a ready 
transdisciplinary (TD) discourse available to them to draw from, though this discourse was not 
primarily academic.  
What I will argue in the rest of this chapter is that students were relying on the sensus 
communis to integrate the insights from the various disciplines, and to construct commonalities 
about them. I borrow this term from Hans Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method to emphasize the 
technical way I am using ‘common sense’ to analyze its role in the integration and production of 
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knowledge in the emerging learner of ID.7 In the ID literature, the role of a common sense 
informed by life and academic experiences is hinted at, but is not explicitly treated. Klein writes, 
“There is no unique or single pedagogy for integrative interdisciplinary learning…All of these 
approaches draw from multiple perspectives on a complex phenomenon for insights that can be 
integrated into a richer, more comprehensive understanding. In integrative learning, perspectives 
emanate from disciplines, cultures, subcultures, or life experiences.”8 In Weird Science, students 
were introduced to disciplines that were unfamiliar to them, and relied, perhaps a little too 
heavily, on their life experiences and communal mores in making sense of them. Presumably, 
with more time and experience, they will become more versed in academic discourse. In the 
meantime, I have found that the struggles the students faced in this course spoke to some 
fundamental aspects about the learning process.  
What Gadamer says is that all knowledge is generated out of the concerns and discourse 
of the sensus communis. The sensus communis is the collective sense of a community, or 
sometimes referred to as the ethos of the community or “common knowledge” that is cultivated 
over time through the shared lived experiences of its members.9 Gadamer did not originate the 
concept of sensus communis (that honor is usually attributed to Immanuel Kant in philosophical 
circles), but he helped to merge it with the notion of the Lebenswelt (the lived world) that 
Wilhelm Dilthey, a predecessor of Gadamer, began.10 Prior to Gadamer’s rendering of the 
concept, it was used in philosophy to account for the universality of the aesthetic sense, or, in 
other words, the general agreement people have about whether something is or is not beautiful. 
But Kant considered the aesthetic sense itself “subjective” and unscientific, and therefore 
suffered by its comparison to the rational, scientific mind. Elsewhere, the fields of rhetoric, 
biblical exegesis, and other fields, starting with the 18th century thinker, Giambattista Vico, saw 
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in the concept of sensus communis a unique role as a practical, concrete, and active basis for 
judgement in discourse and interpretation.  
In line with the goal of Rhetoric, Gadamer revives the notion of persuasion as a way of 
philosophical argumentation that opens up discourse in a way the more precise and narrow 
demonstrations of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) does not. For Gadamer, arguments 
must be convincing to the informed person, which appeals to the broad, universal and multi-
faceted elements of the sensus communis. It is this openness and universality that I perceived as 
vague and merely approximating academic discourse when I read the Weird Science papers. But 
it is exactly the lived experiences we have in the community that make us aware of and 
conditions the problems that eventually become a part of the problems of academic discourse. 
Gadamer calls this precondition of academic knowledge, “foreknowledge”.  
 Below, I first set out the problems facing the notion of integration for ID learning. I 
attempt to define more precisely what integration is, establish how the individual learner 
integrates disciplinary knowledge, and establish the extent and parameters of commensurability 
and consensus between disciplines. I then argue, along with J. Britt Holbrook, that a neutral field 
of discourse that transcends disciplinary limitations (i.e. a TD discourse) seems to be indicated as 
the underlying construct for ID communication and learning. Unlike Holbrook, I argue that the 
TD discourse is one based on the sensus communis, and not one that is constructed out of a 
combination of academic disciplines. I then go on to elaborate what Gadamer means by the 
sensus communis and what significance it has for the idea of integration in ID studies. I conclude 
with reflections on student work and how it exhibits the ideas I argue for. 
  
II. The ‘What’ and ‘Who’ of Integration 
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 Integration is a critical objective in ID learning. Accomplishing this goes to 
demonstrating that the student has found commonalities between disciplines, as well as 
differences, and shows the exercise of crucial meta-cognitive and critical thinking skills. But 
what does it mean for disciplines to become integrated? Does it mean that a variety of disciplines 
become subsumed under one discipline? Does it mean that elements from all the disciplines 
become blended? In Does Interdisciplinarity Promote Learning?, Lisa Lattuca, et. Al delineate 
four ways disciplines can interact in ID learning. They are informed interdisciplinarity, synthetic 
interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, and conceptual interdisciplinarity. In informed ID, a 
single discipline is the focus, and encounters with other disciplines are used to enhance or 
elaborate the main discipline of concern. In synthetic ID, a number of disciplines are considered 
in searching for commonalities, but the disciplines remain identifiable with their parameters and 
methods intact. In TD, disciplinary learning is not the main concern – one uses an approach that 
“transcends” the disciplines and provides a neutral, overarching basis in looking at the various 
disciplines. Finally, in conceptual ID, the authors conceive of an ID that seeks to explore and 
comprehend fundamental concepts of experience and their limits. This approach might use 
disciplinary learning as a tool, but is not focused on a single discipline.11  
I believe that the Weird Science course exhibited characteristics of the latter three ways of 
interacting. There was definitely an expectation that students would understand disciplinary 
methods and vocabulary on their own grounds, but there was also an expectation that students 
would be able to unify them in an overarching way in their papers. My argument holds that 
students rely on the sensus communis as a TD, extra-disciplinary approach to ID learning, as well 
as the basis for understanding the fundamental concepts of disciplines. The important question 
for me in terms of integration is on what basis, whether methodologically or conceptually, do 
6 
 
students unify these perspectives? And very importantly, how does the individual learner go 
about integrating the different perspectives? 
 I believe that the process that goes on at the individual learner’s level is an important area 
to focus on in a discussion of integration. However, I find the literature surprisingly vague on the 
topic of the ‘who’ of integration. There are two philosophers, Hanne Andersen and Susann 
Wagenknecht, who explore this question: “Who is…the knowing subject of interdisciplinary 
teamwork in the end?”12 This question comes at the end of their paper in their section entitled, 
“Summary and conclusion”. What is their concluding thought on the answer? It is this: “There is 
no general answer to this question.”13 
 The reason for the difficulty in answering the question of who is the subject of ID 
learning is probably obvious. In ID learning, there are layers of complexity involving both the 
individual learner, as well as the various players involved in the process - the experts and the 
group members and their roles in the integration process. The authors, citing research done by 
F.A. Rossini and A.L. Porter, isolate four primary ways experts and group members interact in 
interdisciplinary research: “integration by leader”, “common group learning”, “negotiation 
among experts” and “modeling”.”14 It is not worth delving into the intricacies involved in each 
category of interactions since they mainly involve interactions among experts towards research, 
which is not the main concern of this chapter. The main question for us, whether the ID work is 
based on modeling, or on an expert leader or the group members themselves, is how the work 
achieves what the authors call “cognitive integration” in the individual researcher or learner - 
“[N]amely that it will often be too demanding for the individual group member to master several 
fields in detail and that it will therefore often lead to a decrease in depth.”15 In the end, the 
authors have trouble establishing how a learner integrates ID knowledge on an individual level, 
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and leaves it an open question as reflected in the above quote. But is this not the crucial issue to 
be resolved when it comes to the issue of the integration of ID knowledge? 
 ID studies have been a part of a modern movement to displace teacher-centered learning 
with student-centered learning. One example of this effort is the transformative learning theory 
(TLT), which the present argument can be said to represent. The TLT promotes the idea of active 
learning through pedagogy that encourages critical thinking, self-direction, responsibility by the 
student for his or her own learning, and skill-building. It posits that students already have 
assumptions, values, and ideas that are contributory to their learning process. The TLT says that 
learning should further transform the student (versus implant learning in their minds or mold 
them by teaching) by allowing the student opportunities to integrate new knowledge by 
constructing and reconstructing what he or she already knows. Two scholars of TLT, George 
Slavich and Philip Zimbardo, have given us pedagogical methods using TLT to promote 
transformative learning.16 My argument here is that the sensus communis constitutes the 
background knowledge that students bring to learning. From this familiar base, the learner 
integrates disciplinary knowledge by constructing and reconstructing what is already known to 
her to meet the demands of new material and expectations. Whereas Zimbardo, Slavich, and 
others have explicated pedagogical methods that can be effective for encouraging transformative 
learning, Gadamer gives us the theoretical underpinnings that can explain how the integration 
happens on the level of the individual learner.  
For the reasons above, I prefer the term ‘agent’ to describe the ‘who’ of ID learning as 
opposed to other ways of describing him – E.g. ‘subject’ or ‘knower’. The term highlights the 
active/constructive and concrete characteristics of the learner. Gadamer’s own term for ‘agent’ 
would be the person of ‘phronesis’, a term borrowed from Aristotle, and in the Greek means, 
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“practical wisdom”. For Gadamer, like Aristotle, the individual who can reflect intellectually is 
the same individual who lives in a community and is ethically and aesthetically inclined, and is 
capable of making decisions. This is the individual that is at the center of ID learning. 
 
 
III. Consensus, Commensurability, and the Need for a TD Discourse 
In this section, I would like to explore the possibilities and limits of the consensus of 
disciplinary discourse, and the issue of commensurability. In the ID literature, despite the 
importance of the notion of consensus, it is often presumed rather than treated explicitly. But as 
Holbrook shows well, we cannot presume that discourse, and therefore understanding, between 
disciplines is even commensurable, much less unifiable under a universal discourse. Clearly, 
discourse between disciplines is not always smooth and transparent. A biologist does not 
necessarily understand the nuances of quantum mechanics, nor the physicist understand the 
nuances of genetic theory.  
Holbrook believes that the thesis about the integration between disciplines that dominates 
ID scholarship is what he calls ‘the Habermas-Klein thesis’. It holds that the commensurability 
and consensus between disciplines can be achieved in a way that is transparent to all involved. In 
this thesis, the desirability and possibility of consensus is mostly presumed, and the transparency 
of communication and reason is mostly unproblematic. This thesis draws its inspiration from 
Jurgen Habermas’ model of communicative action in which rational actors, based on trust, 
rational utterances, and reciprocation come to a common understanding. Any obstacles to a 
common, rational understanding is seen as temporary and commensurable. Holbrook believes 
that this take on communication describes Klein’s view of ID communication as well.17  While 
Klein, a well-known figure in ID scholarship, acknowledges the nuances and complexities of ID 
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learning, she nonetheless remains committed to the view that a common understanding based on 
this commensurability can be achieved. Holbrook believes that actual ID communication is 
messier and more complex than the picture depicted by the Habermas-Klein thesis. 
In comparison, Holbrook’s Kuhn-MacIntyre thesis holds that disciplines evolve into 
language systems with their own paradigms and conceptual frameworks, and are 
incommensurable to each other. This thesis draws its inspiration from Thomas Kuhn, who 
famously argued that scientific paradigms were a historical and conventional creation. Once 
created, he believed that the scientific paradigm (e.g. Einstein’s relativity model of the universe) 
began to define the meaning and significance of the language a scientist used. For Kuhn, the 
conventional and unscientific paradigm preceded and set the stage for scientific work. The 
implication of the Kuhn-MacIntyre thesis for ID studies is that disciplinary communication 
cannot be truly integrated, and that instead they can merely interact with each other. According 
to this thesis, no one working in one discipline could truly understand the meanings and 
significance of the language of another discipline without being inculcated in that discipline’s 
worldview. Learning the language of a discipline is like learning a foreign language. In this case, 
integration is seen as possible only as translation of one disciplinary discourse into another. This 
can be seen as a case of synthetic ID in the way Lattuca, et. Al spoke of. The situation does not 
support the notion that a neutral approach could guide the discourse, nor that a blended one could 
be achieved. The disciplines can be ID by co-existing and being in dialogue with each other, 
while maintaining each its own parameters and methods. 
I am not rejecting this possibility, and I can conceive of particular instances when 
translation would be the primary form of integration, especially when learning a new discipline 
for the first time. I encountered this when I worked with a mathematics professor recently in 
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developing a logic course. I had to translate certain mathematical notations into philosophical 
ones, understanding that they had the same meaning. However, my focus in this chapter is to 
understand how an emerging ID learner integrates disciplinary discourse in a broader, more 
fundamental context. Students in the Weird Science course are often not even versed enough in 
one discipline to be counted as competent language-speakers of that discipline. 
 I find Holbrook’s Bataille-Lyotard thesis to be the most useful for my argument. In this 
thesis, Holbrook makes a distinction between “weak” and “strong” communication, 
appropriating and reinventing George Bataille’s usages of the terms. He calls communication 
“weak” when everyone involved in the communication readily understands the language and 
there are no strong barriers blocking communication. It is “weak” because the language is 
penetrable. Holbrook understands this form of communication as the predominant one in 
communication within disciplines, but also implies that the same commensurability holds, for the 
most part, in ID communication.18 I agree with Holbrook, but for different reasons. My argument 
shows that the reason commensurability holds between disciplinary discourse is because of a 
more fundamental commonality which I am owing to the sensus communis. Indeed, Holbrook 
himself seems to indicate that the goals of weak communication is based on the concerns of the 
community at heart: “Bataille’s weak communication is thus used for the purposes of gaining a 
clear understanding of the things that constitute the objective world and of establishing a 
consensus as to how we ought to act in order to be productive members of society.”19 Reflecting 
this idea, Gadamer shows below that our concerns and problems as members of a society and as 
people defined by the human condition are at the heart of what we study in academic disciplines. 
However, once the problems become removed from the context of lived experience and become 
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a part of the abstract framework of disciplinary discourse, common sense starts to appear 
inadequate to elucidate those same problems. 
The other form of communication that Holbrook attributes to the Bataille-MacIntyre 
thesis is the “strong” form of communication. This is when language presents barriers to 
communication between disciplines. In Bataille’s formulation, weak communication cannot 
penetrate strong communication when the discourse begins to express extraordinary concerns 
that transcend our ordinary understanding and therefore causes a break in ordinary 
communication. To understand Bataille’s understanding of strong communication adequately 
would take us too far afield. The important thing for us here is to understand Holbrook’s 
appropriation of this term. In Holbrook’s context, an example of strong communication might be 
over-specialized disciplinary terminology. A learner outside the discipline might follow 
specialized discourse up to a point, but communication would break down if it became so 
specialized, that the learner’s conceptual framework was no longer adequate to making sense of 
the discourse. Nonetheless, the productive aspect of strong communication is that it highlights 
areas of difference between disciplines, which is as important a characteristic in ID studies as is 
the commonalities underlying the disciplines. Holbrook sees this thesis’ accounting of difference 
as an improvement over what he believes to be the naïvité of the Habermas-Klein thesis.  
 Holbrook’s solution to the problem presented by strong communication reflects my own 
view about how ID communication works, though not completely. He believes that the solution 
to a break-down in ID communication is to “co-create” a new genre of discourse that discards the 
identities of the old disciplines.20 I agree with Holbrook that, essentially, we need a TD approach 
to ID discourse. However, he does not fully elaborate what this would entail. What would a 
genre of discourse look like that both blends and blurs the identities of several disciplines? 
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Holbrook’s goal might make more sense applied to more specialized academic work. For my 
purposes, however, Gadamer’s notion of the sensus communis seems to me to better elucidate the 
TD approach needed to understand how students in the Weird Science course integrated 
disciplinary discourse. 
  
IV. The Role of the Sensus Communis in ID Integration 
  Gadamer believed that our training as learners begin with our immersion in the 
communal sense of the sensus communis. This communal sense is not interested in precision or 
specialization, but dwells in the “verisimilar” or probable.21 To the specialist, this imprecision 
might be seen as vague and inadequate. But for Gadamer, it speaks to the fact that common sense 
is broad and open enough to be the flexible source of the breadth and depth of the full scope of 
academic disciplines. But whether we become specialists in the stars above, or in the 
psychological dynamics within, our first approximations about how the world works all start in 
common sense.  
For Gadamer, the most basic level of educating someone is in acculturating them into the 
sensus communis “in getting beyond his naturalness”.22 We are born biological creatures, but we 
become, through experience, acculturated human beings with ethical, aesthetic, intellectual 
concerns that go beyond the merely natural. From the earliest associations with others, we are 
always and already in the midst of being acculturated into the habits, norms, and traditions of our 
community. He calls this process the process of Bildung (culture). In the earliest forms, the 
knowledge we get from Bildung is approximate and more unconscious than reflective, but as we 
become more educated within more narrowly-defined “cultures” of academic disciplines or other 
arenas of learning, the knowledge becomes more precise, reflective, and/or rational. But though 
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the quality and the quantity of the knowledge may change, the fundamental process of acquiring 
education, for Gadamer, remains the same throughout. He writes, “Hence, all theoretical 
Bildung, even acquiring foreign languages and conceptual worlds, is merely the continuation of a 
process of Bildung that begins much earlier.”23 As I have been saying, the process begins with 
the sensus communis, the communal sense that we all share in our lived experiences with others. 
There are two aspects of the sensus communis that are significant for our purposes in looking at 
how students integrate disciplinary knowledge. First, the sensus communis is inherently 
consensus-building, and second, it has an inherent sense of standards that seek to evaluate and 
validate knowledge. These two aspects of the sensus communis condition our higher-order 
thinking in the disciplines. 
I must say a word here about what it means to share a communal sense. Not all 
communities share the same norms and expectations, and clearly, there is a wide variation of 
what is acceptable, especially from a global perspective. What is considered culturally normal in 
Korea will, of course, differ from what is considered culturally normal in Turkey. Even in one 
country, like America, there can be subcultures within a dominant mainstream culture, and 
fluidity between subcultures. Gadamer himself faced criticism about what he meant by culture 
and tradition, criticisms that he could not fully address. I doubt that anyone who speaks about 
culture could fully address what does and does not count towards inclusion in a given culture. To 
do so, in any case, would be beyond the scope of this chapter.  
What Gadamer focuses on instead are the ways in which our experiences in the 
community contribute to the font of knowledge that provide the basis for our larger, more 
speculative ideas about how the world works and what our place in it is. In other words, he is 
interested in the font of knowledge that goes into understanding the human condition, which 
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might speak to universal commonalities between all people. That can be questioned and if it is 
better, we can specify that Gadamer’s focus is on questions framed by a western European 
approach to philosophy and philology. In any case, I wanted to distance his concerns from the 
concerns that might interest an anthropologist or another someone working in another discipline. 
He is not so interested in the empirical or “natural” concerns of a community – like how they 
acquire food or how they heal those who are sick, or what are their marriage and death rituals. 
Paralleling this, I observed that what occupied student papers in Weird Science were not so much 
the particularities of their lives, but broad, sweeping concerns, which indicated to me that 
students were interested in exploring the deep, fundamental issues of humanity. 
When they had one, students’ theses clearly reflected concerns that are in line with a 
thoughtful person’s reflections on the human condition. A few students expressed hope that the 
knowledge gained in the course would be learned by all for the sake of a better future for 
humanity.24 Other students expressed concerns that humans are incorrigibly greedy or power-
hungry.25 These were themes borne out of their lived experiences and which were familiar to 
them. From these frameworks, they could then construct a bridge to the more unfamiliar 
discourse of the academic experts. Their attempts at transforming pre-existing knowledge to the 
new ones had mixed success, but their attempts were as much as could be expected from 
introductory students.  
 For Gadamer, the work of the academic is the culmination and fulfillment of the same 
impulses that motivate common sense understanding. But whereas the valuations of the person of 
common sense only asserts itself “without being able to give its reasons”26, scholars are able to 
be self-reflective about its assumptions and assertions. The fact that disciplines can become so 
specialized speaks to the level of sophistication and nuance that people are capable of generating 
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and advancing. This is the mark of human ingenuity for Gadamer, and need not be seen as 
antagonistic to common sense or elitist as some philosophers believe.27 
 Gadamer describes the sensus communis as both historical and aesthetic. What he means 
is that communities share habits, customs, and traditions that are connected by a shared history. 
This history informs the world-view (Weltanschauung) of the community’s members and shapes 
our values and the very way we see our world. This accumulated/constructed history at any given 
time makes up our culture. In addition to it being historical, Gadamer also describes the sensus 
communis as ‘aesthetic’ because initially our sense of what is right, wrong, good, and beautiful 
are based on an affective sense governed by the norms and customs of our community, and are 
not necessarily rational, academic, nor scientific. Only after more experiences with formal 
learning does one begin to account for and explain their valuations. Even then, Gadamer 
nonetheless maintains that the various scholarly disciplines within which scholars work are no 
less communities with habits and traditions as is the sensus communis. This justifies why 
Gadamer later shifts the talk of aesthetics to prejudice in developing his method for 
understanding the human sciences.28 For Gadamer, like common sense, disciplines are self-
justifying and rely on a history of created norms or traditions, or prejudices. Disciplines, 
however, have less membership than the common sense community, and is in this way more 
specialized. The task for the emerging learner of ID is to integrate the more specialized language 
of disciplines into the more common discourse, and in turn become acculturated into the new 
discourse. Fortunately, as Gadamer has been arguing, there is much foreknowledge that is 
already shared between common and theoretical discourses. 
 Two fundamental features of the sensus communis that carry over into theoretical 
discourse that can also help us to understand what we have said about integration so far are 
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these: First, Gadamer accounts for the commensurability of discourse, as well as the unifying 
element of integration by revealing a circularity in the process of acculturating individuals in the 
sensus communis, which is the same process in acquiring disciplinary knowledge. The individual 
uses what is already familiar to condition the reception of new knowledge, and seeks, in turn, to 
transform the new knowledge into the familiar. Gadamer writes, “To recognize one’s own in the 
alien, to become at home in it, is the basic movement of spirit [Geist], whose being consists only 
in returning to itself from what is other.”29   
Second, common sense seeks to make sense of the world; in the most minimal expression 
of this making sense, a standard is implied. Prior to mature judgment, Gadamer believes that we 
evaluate the world in terms of tact or taste. “Tact” is often used to refer to behaviors and “taste” 
to an aesthetic judgment, but both are acquired senses that make judgements using standards 
learned from one’s community. A child might say that he should not speak too loudly because 
‘mother says so’, or that he likes the look of those shoes ‘just because’. They are ‘modes of 
knowledge’, Gadamer says, but ones that rely on a standard that is merely felt. With maturity, 
experience, and more education, one can make more reflective judgments, using a stronger sense 
of validity.30 Nonetheless, that standard, for Gadamer should remain open and flexible, reflecting 
the human experience.31  
I believe that these two observations about the relationship between common sense and 
disciplinary knowledge help to elucidate how students in the Weird Science course in fact 
integrated the various disciplinary perspectives presented to them. No matter what the discipline, 
there was an utter conviction that the disciplines had something to offer the students, and that 
they would understand the significance of the lessons. They also approached the disciplines with 
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the conviction that they were capable of evaluating the worth of the lessons, rooted in the 
expectations that their experience in the common sense world provided. 
 
V. Integration in Weird Science Student Papers 
  I found that the most integrated papers in Weird Science also exhibited the most 
dissonance. That might not be such a bad thing. According to John C. Bean, who wrote a popular 
guide book for professors to encourage active learning in the classroom, “cognitive dissonance” 
should be the very objective of our pedagogical methods.32 For, in this dissonance, students’ 
familiar ways of thinking are challenged, and thus awakened, become open to new insights. I 
found that the more ambitious a student was in integrating disciplinary insights, the more he or 
she appeared unorthodoxed and perhaps disorderly. Interestingly, this is in line with Steve 
Fuller’s idea about “deviant” ID. He argues that when a thinker attempts to approach ID outside 
of the specialized language of academia, she appears “‘eclectic’ and ‘arbitrary’, very much as 
upstart entrepreneurs look to managers in established firms, where the former wish to ‘creatively 
destroy’ and the latter to ‘monopolize’ markets.”33  In other words, academic training sets up an 
expectation about how students will resolve problems. Using common sense discourse will, by 
comparison, appear arbitrary and quirky. But inevitably, students in the Weird Science course 
approached problems in the course with the only tools they had, and this was their common 
sense informed by their life and academic experiences. Their efforts – because of their eclectic 
approaches and not despite them – suggested to me that they were genuinely engaged in what the 
various disciplines offered. On the other hand, papers that stuck with one discipline or one theme 
without attempting to integrate the many disciplinary perspectives offered in the course were 
also the smoothest and most organized. 
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 I would like to conclude by sharing my thoughts on papers from each category – 1. 
papers attempting to integrate disciplinary perspectives, 2. papers not attempting to integrate 
disciplinary perspectives. In general, I considered papers integrated if the student attempted to 
provide a unifying theme or thesis that purported to organize ideas from several disciplines. I 
considered papers unintegrated if the student did not attempt to make sense of several 
disciplinary perspectives. 
 In terms of integrated papers, I found W.C.’s paper (a paper I referred to earlier as 
misappropriating Descartes) to exhibit characteristics of an emerging learner of ID in integrating 
new disciplinary insights. His paper, as well as many of the integrated papers, in fact, touch on 
deep, fundamental matters. W.C.’s thesis was about the unique and dominant status that humans 
had on earth. In discussing his thesis, he points to evolutionary theory, genetic theory, Cartesian 
philosophy, music, the epic of Gilgamesh, religion, gender theory, prosthetics, physics and much 
more. His paper is eleven pages long, which is only space enough for broad, surface renderings 
of these topics. Nonetheless, it helps him to make a number of conclusions about his thesis, 
which reflect Gadamer’s ideas about the kind of agency the learner has – the agent is the person 
of phronesis, and has both an open-ended and practical comportment to his world. W.C. 
concludes that “Humans will endlessly expand their knowledge.”34 and that “Being human is a 
natural ability that any person should hold dear to themselves and use what is given to express 
try to better the rest of the living world.”35 A number of students reflected both the “endlessness” 
of knowledge, as well as expressed ethical aspirations in their conclusions.36  
 In terms of papers that do not attempt to integrate the various disciplinary perspectives, I 
point to G.M.’s paper. I found it to be quite cohesive, and well-argued, two marks of a well-
written paper. But it also did not, by the same token, take much risk in terms of exploring 
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perspectives that were not new to him, or so I gather. Despite the fact that G.M. made a 
conclusion that was reminiscent of a “deviant” ID paper, writing, “[T]he question should not be, 
“What does it mean to be human?,” the question should be, “ What could humans do to bring 
peace amongst ourselves?” would the wealthy human’s response be the same of a homeless 
humans’ response?”37, the actual content of the paper revolved around the theme of the human 
brain and the scientific understanding of it. G.M. begins with a discussion about the genetic 
similarity between humans and chimpanzees, and then goes on to touch upon how a doctor used 
HeLa cells therapeutically, how we evolved from the Peking Man, how we have changed the 
physical environment of the earth, and how we can make artificial meat from 3-D printers, in 
addition to other scientific topics related to the brain. G.M. does draw from a variety of topics, 
but they mostly relate to the biological sciences. Despite the sweeping question that ends his 
paper as I state above, G.M.’s paper presents a narrow argument which does not contain much 
that sticks out as particularly arbitrary or quirky. 
 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Let me summarize the main points of this chapter. I started with the premise that integration 
was a key notion for ID. I attempted to elucidate how integration happened in the emerging 
learner of ID as evidenced by my interaction with students in the Weird Science course. The key 
figure that, to me, elucidated this process was Gadamer and his ideas about the sensus communis. 
He believed that all disciplinary knowledge is the outgrowth of a more fundamental acculturation 
process that begins with common sense knowledge. Two significant aspects of common sense 
that conditions how we learn anything at all is that 1. it seeks to unify new knowledge into the 
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familiar store of common sense knowledge, which explains the unifying and consensus-seeking 
aspect of integration and 2. it is inherently governed by a standard of validity, which speaks to 
the fact that one integrates knowledge based on the norms and values of one’s community. Later, 
the standards of validity become heightened as the community becomes more specialized and 
disciplinary.  
Another theme of my paper was to validate the integration process that the Weird Science 
students exhibited in their papers. Initially, I had difficulty understanding how it was that 
students were integrating the various disciplinary perspectives in their pursuit of the question, 
“What does it mean to be human?” In adopting the interpretation that they were using common 
sense (in the way Gadamer talked about) as a basis of that integration, I came to understand that 
what appeared to be unorthodoxed and eclectic ways of interpreting the problem in their papers 
was a sign of something more productive of the learning process. It was a sign that they were 
genuinely engaging with what was unfamiliar to them, which caused them to appropriate the new 
ideas in ways that seemed quirky from the standpoint of a disciplinarian. In contrast, those who 
chose to use more finite, perhaps familiar, disciplinary parameters produced smoother, more 
organized papers (that is, among those who attempted to write a thesis-driven, organized paper). 
Presumably, all the students will go on to become more versed in academic and disciplinary 
language with time and experience. 
Gadamer’s mature view in Truth and Method elaborates upon his ideas adapting them to 
increasingly more specialized forms of discourse. He talks about “horizons” of interpretation 
which speak to the historical, cultural, and educational conditions that both enable and limit a 
thinker’s field of vision. “Horizon” can refer to the broad and flexible field of the common sense 
world, or it could refer to the more narrow disciplinary boundaries of the historian or another 
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disciplinarian (who can turn her eyes to either worlds). Rather than fixed points, these horizons 
can stretch and reach beyond themselves to expand and/or mesh with other horizons, and become 
as broad, diverse and nuanced as the finitude of one’s existence will allow. 
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